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risk encountered by the plaintiff to be beyond the duty imposed on
the defendant.
More importantly, the instant decision demonstrates a tendency
by the lower courts to extract from Dixie and Pierre a "rule" out of
what was originally meant to be an approach or technique.33 Prior to
the introduction of the duty-risk approach, courts had, by applying
the "passive negligence" doctrine as a rule, generally relieved the
original wrongdoer from liability." Disapproval of the "passive negli-
gence" rule was not intended to establish a converse rule sustaining
a finding of liability against the original wrongdoer regardless of the
nature of the subsequent misconduct of a third party." Nevertheless,
in applying the holding in Pierre to the factual situation before it, the
court in the present case appears to have substituted a rule automati-
cally sustaining the liability of the original wrongdoer for one auto-
matically rejecting liability. Duty-risk should be viewed as a
method of analysis that leaves the courts free to consider the acts of
misconduct in the context of the facts and circumstances of each
controversy and to confer immunity upon the original wrongdoer
where policy so dictates. The current confusion exemplified by Shaw
suggests a need by the lower courts to pause and take note of the true
nature of the duty-risk approach so that the effort of the supreme
court to infuse flexibility into Louisiana tort law will not be frus-
trated.
Sylvia R. Cooks
LEGAL EXPENSES AND THE ORIGIN TEST
Taxpayers, sole shareholders of a corporation, received the cor-
33. See Addison v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 805, 812 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973);
Phillips v. Ursin, 280 So. 2d 243, 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Craig v. Burch, 228 So.
2d 723, 729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Pico v. Allstate Ins. Co., 206 So. 2d 99, 101 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968).
34. See cases cited at note 2, supra.
35. Ruminations at 393.
36. Referring to Pierre, Professor Robertson observed: "What the case amounts
to is a clear and almost fully explicit admonition that rules are not magic; that each
case must be approached, within a fabric of principle and doctrine, on its own facts.
It seems evident that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has been trending rather
strongly in recent years toward a fairly consistent position that the Louisiana tort law
should seek to avoid the proliferation of doctrines of narrow and rigid thrust, in favor
of more straightforward, conscious, and fact-oriented resort to the underlying princi-
ples of the Louisiana Civil Code." Dialogues at 24-25. See also Ruminations at 369.
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porate assets upon liquidation, including a potential anti-trust claim'
which had no ascertainable market value at the time of distribution.2
The taxpayers treated the legal expenses subsequently incurred by
them in settling the claim as deductible expenses for the mainte-
nance and conservation of property.' Reversing the Tax Court's al-
lowance of the deduction,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the deductibility of legal expenses ultimately depends on the
origin of the legal claim and thus classified the taxpayers' expenses
as non-deductible capital expenditures.' Estate of Meade v.
Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882
(1974).
Legal expenses are susceptible of three tax results. Those expen-
ses incurred in connection with purely personal activities which have
no profit-seeking motive are non-deductible under section 262 of the
Internal Revenue Code and may not be capitalized. Expenses which
are "ordinary and necessary" (1) to carry on a trade or business
(section 162), or (2) for the production or collection of income, for the
management of income-producing property, or in connection with
determining tax liability (section 212) may be deducted currently.
Finally, section 263 requires capitalization rather than current de-
duction of any profit-seeking expenditure which is capital in nature
rather than "ordinary and necessary."'
In classifying legal expenses, the Commissioner and the courts
early focused attention on the taxpayer's motive or purpose for incur-
ring the expense in question. In the often-cited case of Rassenfoss v.
Commissioner,7 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that a partner was entitled to currently deduct legal expenses in-
curred in defending an action by a superintendent of the partnership
who claimed an interest in the business and sought an accounting
1. See Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
2. For the implications of such an "open transaction," see Burnet v. Logan, 283
U.S. 404 (1931); Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212.
4. Estate of Joseph M. Meade v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935
(1972).
5. Capitalization rather than current deduction resulted in an additional tax
amounting to $29,991.37 for Mr. and Mrs. Meade and $65,221.26 for Mr. and Mrs.
King, the taxpayers in the instant case. Since the expenses were deemed capital in
nature they could only be used to offset the capital gain realized by the taxpayers from
the settlement and could not be deducted from ordinary income.
6. Examples of capital expenditures can be found in the Treas. Reg. §
1.263(a)-2(a)-(h) (1960). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263 limits deductions otherwise
allowed by sections 212 and 162. See id. § 261. See also id. § 1221 for the definition of
"capital asset."
7. 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946).
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from the partners. To justify the allowance, the court reasoned that
"the main and primary purpose of the suit which petitioner defended
was for an accounting and any question of title was merely incidental
thereto."I Although difficult to apply because of its subjective nature,
the "primary purpose" test was followed by a substantial number of
lower courts in order to separate deductible expenses under sections
212 and 162 from section 263 capital expenditures.'
The "origin of the claim" test was first clearly enunciated in
United States v. Gilmore'° to differentiate between section 262 per-
sonal expenses and section 212 deductible expenses. Refusing to ac-
cept taxpayer's argument that certain legal expenses incurred in de-
fending a divorce action were deductible under section 212, the Court
held that:
[T]he origin and character of the claim with respect to which an
expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences
upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of
whether the expense . . . is deductible or not. .... .
Three years later, the Supreme Court used the origin test to distin-
guish between deductible section 162 business expenses and non-
deductible section 262 personal expenses.'2
A major extension of the origin test came in the landmark deci-
sions of Woodward v. Commissioner and United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.4 For the first time, the Supreme Court applied the
origin test in the area of section 263 capital expenditures. Both cases
involved legal expenses incurred to comply with local laws requiring
8. Id. at 767.
9. For a brief list of cases, see Gibbs, Developing Patterns in the Deductibility of
Professional Fees, 50 TAXES 771, 775 (1972).
10. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). While the origin of the claim test was clearly stated for
the first time by Gilmore, similar reasoning was employed in earlier cases. See Deputy
v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
11. 372 U.S. at 49. In Gilmore, taxpayer alleged that if he lost the divorce litiga-
tion he would lose the bulk of his personal property from which he derived the major
part of his income. The Supreme Court held that none of the expenses of resisting his
wife's claims could be considered deductible business expenses.
12. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). The Court accepted the tax-
payer's claim that legal expenses incurred by him in unsuccessfully defending a crimi-
nal prosecution should be deductible under section 162. "The criminal charges against
the respondent found their source in his business activities as a securities dealer. The
respondent's legal fees, paid in defense against those charges, therefore clearly qualify
under Gilmore as 'expenses paid or incurred ... in carrying on any trade or business'
within the meaning of § 162(a)." Id. at 689.
13. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
14. 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
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majority stockholders to purchase the stock held by minority stock-
holders who dissented to proposed corporate actions.'" There was no
question that the payments for the stock itself should be treated as
capital investments;" the contested issue was the proper treatment
of the expenses of negotiating the fair price of the stock. '7 The taxpay-
ers urged that the "primary purpose" test should be applied and that
the legal expenses of valuation should be deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses.'8 They claimed that the transfer of the capital
asset was merely incidental to their main purpose of fixing the price.
Pointing out that the primary purpose test was too subjective
and would encourage "resort to formalisms and artificial distinc-
tions,""6 the Court rejected taxpayers' arguments and held that the
primary purpose test does not apply to cases involving the disposition
or acquisition of title to a capital asset.'" Employing the origin of the
claim test of Gilmore, the Court then traced the origin of the expenses
to the acquisition of the stock and ruled the valuation only incidental
thereto. The decisions provoked some criticism,2' but on the whole
their rationale was received with approval and applied without hesi-
15. The corporate action in Hilton Hotels was a merger; the action in Woodward
was a perpetual extension of the corporate charter. Under the New York law applicable
in Hilton Hotels, title to the stock passed to the taxpayers as soon as the minority
registered their dissent. In Woodward, passage of title was delayed under Iowa law
until after the price was set in the appraisal proceeding. To the Supreme Court, this
was merely "a distinction without a difference." 397 U.S. at 584.
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (1960): "The following ... include examples
of capital expenditures: (a) The cost of acquisition. . . of. . .property having a useful
life substantially beyond the taxable year."
17. Although this note is concerned primarily with the tax treatment of legal
expenses, the law is not so limited. Cost of acquisition or disposition of property should
properly include accountant's fees and brokerage costs as well as attorney's fees. See
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
18. In Hilton Hotels, the taxpaying stockholder, a corporation, claimed the expen-
ses to be "ordinary and necessary" to its business under section 162. The taxpaying
stockholders in Woodward were acting in an individual non-business capacity. They
claimed their expenses to be "ordinary and necessary" under section 212.
19. 397 U.S. at 577.
20. Both Woodward and Hilton Hotels dealt with the acquisition of a capital
asset. For a case in which the legal expenses of a disposition were required to be
capitalized by reducing the amount realized, see Third Nat'l Bank v. United States,
427 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1970).
21. See Gibbs, supra note 9 at 777, where it is suggested that the taxpayers' claims
may have originated in connection with the conservation of their stock within the
deductions allowed by section 212(2). See also Comment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 538, 543
(1970), which contends that the origin test as applied in Woodward related deductibil-
ity to the capacity of the litigating taxpayer. The comment suggests that the expense




tation by the lower courts."
Difficulties may arise, however, when the parties have already
agreed to transfer a capital asset and legal expenses are subsequently
incurred in enforcing the transfer. Two appellate court decisions held
that such expenses are not part of the cost of the transfer and can be
deducted from ordinary income. In Naylor v. Commissioner,3 legal
expenses were incurred in negotiations to determine and collect the
book value of stock that the taxpayers had sold when the purchaser
exercised his option to buy. The Fifth Circuit held the expenses to
be ordinary and necessary for the collection of income under what is
now sectiorn 212(1).11 In Commissioner v. Doering,"5 the taxpayer was
given a pro rata portion of a claim against a third party in exchange
for his stock at liquidation. As in Naylor, the Second Circuit chose
not to treat the expenses of prosecuting the claim as section 263
capital expenditures, but allowed the deductions under section 212.6
The instant case offered the Fifth Circuit an opportunity to re-
examine the deductions allowed in Naylor and Doering in light of the
origin test as applied in Woodward and Hilton Hotels. The taxpayers
in Meade attempted to bring their expenses within the deductions
expressly allowed by section 212, advancing the reasoning accepted
in Naylor and Doering.Y The Tax Court allowed the deduction as
expenses for the collection of income, expressly refusing to abandon
the rationale of Doering.25 The Fifth Circuit, although admitting that
Naylor and Doering presented problems similar to the instant case,2
distinguished the two prior decisions by noting that in Meade the
anti-trust claim was only a claim and not an enforceable right,
whereas in Naylor and Doering the legal expenses were incurred to
enforce contracts that were already fully negotiated and signed. 0
22. Third Nat'l Bank v. United States, 427 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1970), Helgerson v.
United States, 426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970) (attorney's fees originating in the process
of disposition of stock were capital expenditures). See also Ransburg v. United States,
440 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1971) (legal expenses for interpretation of buy and sell agree-
ment having their origin in the acquisition and disposition of stock were neither ordi-
nary nor necessary); Great Lakes Pipeline Co. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1159
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (expenses not deductible as incidental to section 337 liquidation, but
were part of the sale of capital assets).
23. 203 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1953).
24. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(2).
25. 335 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 741.
27. Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935, 937 (1972).
29. 489 F.2d at 167.
30. Naylor v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1953); Commissioner v.
Doering, 39 T. C. 647, 650 (1963).
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The Meade court, however, failed to explain why the distinction
should dictate different tax treatment. Since the origin test is con-
cerned only with whether a particular claim has its origin in a capital
transaction, the claim's enforceability would seem irrelevant to es-
tablishing deductibility. The origin of the claim, not the present en-
forceability of the claim, should be the controlling factor. Despite the
court's reluctance to expressly disavow the earlier cases, the fact that
they were distinguished is a signal to potential litigants that the
origin test will be applied in the future. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
cautioned against placing undue reliance on the prior decisions.',
The particular facts in Meade leave room for further speculation.
The possibility of filing a civil anti-trust suit was first contemplated
by the corporation within the ordinary course of its business. The
liquidation forced the taxpayers to prosecute the claim to final settle-
ment in their capacity as individual shareholders. Under these facts,
the expenses were held to be of a capital nature and part of the cost
of the stock. But had the corporation itself litigated the claim to its
conclusion, every indication points toward allowing the deduction
under section 1622 since the origin of the claim then would have
arisen from the "ordinary and necessary" business of the corpora-
tion.33 Thus, the origin of the claim may change, depending on the
capacity of the person litigating it.
At the trial level, the Tax Court specifically rejected such a
conclusion, stating that the "origin" does not mean "how the claim
was acquired," but rather "the event which gave rise to the claim."',
Since the cost of the event (the anti-trust suit) would have been
deductible to the corporation, the Tax Court reasoned that it should
be deductible for the shareholders. In reversing the Tax Court's deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit followed a formula that is basic to the tax
structure. Deductibility is not determined solely by scrutinizing an
isolated event; the courts look to the character or nature of the claim
as related to the capacity of the taxpayer. While the origin test as
applied in Meade may not have eliminated all of the ",uncertainties"
31. "We think that the Naylor and Doering decisions have been considerably
eroded by Woodward and Hilton Hotels .. " 489 F.2d at 167.
32. See 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935, 937 (1972), where the Commissioner "admits
that if the corporations had received the $900,000, it would constitute [ordinary]
income" and legal expenses would not be capitalized.
33. There is one possible exception. If the corporation had prosecuted the claim
in anticipation of liquidation, the expense would not be ordinary under section 162 and
it would be necessary to capitalize the attorney's fees. See Of Course, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974), overruling Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345
F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
34. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. at 938.
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and "formalisms" of the primary purpose test it was designed to
replace, the subjective motives of the taxpayer are no longer control-
ling. Thus, the origin test should lead to more consistent results.
Bruce Achille Gaudin
FUTURE INFLATION AND DAMAGE AWARDS
Although money damages awarded in a tort action cannot make
the victim whole again, the award provides the only means available
to compensate the plaintiff for his injury and to place him in a posi-
tion roughly equivalent to that which he enjoyed before the accident.I
In arriving at a figure that will theoretically reimburse the victim for
his loss, various factors must be considered.' One important compo-
nent often ignored in calculating the amount of damages is the possi-
bility that inflation may occur in the future. At the outset it should
be noted, however, that the only portion of the plaintiffs award that
may be affected by inflation is the sum given for some future eco-
nomic deprivation, such as loss of future wages or future medical
expenses; future economic developments are irrelevant to items such
as pain and suffering or past medical expenses which represent losses
that have already accrued at the time of judgment.
The need to adjust damage amounts to allow for future inflation
is sharpened by the impact of the technique, termed reducing to
"present value," often used by the courts to calculate future dam-
ages. An award for loss of future wages should exactly compensate the
victim for what he would have received had he not been injured; it
should not place him in a better monetary position than he would
have enjoyed had he received his future salary in periodic payments.3
If the victim is presently given the total dollar amount of damages
that the fact-finder has determined he is entitled to, he has been over-
compensated to the extent of the "earning power" of the sum he
receives.' A sum of money available at present is worth more than an
1. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916).
2. United States v. Boykin, 49 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1931) (present value of lump sum
award); Gaspard v. Le Maire, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963) (effects of past and
present inflation); Brown v. S.A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891 (1960)
(victim's life expectancy); Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974)
(probability of future job promotion).
3. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916).
4. "So far as a verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits, it will
afford more than compensation if it be made up by aggregating the benefits without
taking account of the earning power of the money that is presently to be awarded. It
is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth more than the like sum of
money payable in the future." Id.
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